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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
DIvoRcE-FuLL FAITH AND CREDIT-DECREE AGAINST NON-RESDENT WIFE
As BASIS FOR MODIFYING SEPARATION DEcREE IN STATE OF WIF='s REsi-
DuNcE-[United States].-A husband had obtained a separation a mensa
et thoro because of the wife's fault in the District of Columbia where both
parties were domiciled. Subsequently he acquired a domicil in Virginia and
sought an absolute divorce on grounds not available in the District. Notice
being given, the wife, who was still residing at the former home, filed a.
special appearance to deny jurisdiction in the court and her husband's right
to be before it. In granting the divorce, the Virginia court deemed the
wife's participation in the litigation on the merits sufficient to constitute a.
general appearance. The husband's later application to the District of*
Columbia court to alter its decree to conform with the terms of the Virginia.
divorce was denied. Held, by the United States Supreme Court on certiorari'
that recognition of the Virginia decree was required by the full faith and.
credit clause of the United States Constitution.2
The result in the instant case seems proper enough on the authority of'
the closely analogous case of Cheever v. Wilson,3 which the Court did not.
discuss.' There, also, a divorce decree was held entitled to full faith and
credit where the complainant was domiciled in the state of the forum and.
the non-resident defendant had made a general appearance. The principal
case however rests on other bases which may well be challenged.
In one rather indefinite paragraph the Court possibly implies that thei
"matrimonial domicil" doctrine of Atherton v. Atherton5 might aid in.
achieving the desired result. This contention, if there was an intention
to advance it, is of questionable soundness in view of the usual construction
of "matrimonial domicil" as meaning "the place where the parties last lived.
as husband and wife with intent of making that place their home."6 Int
the instant case, inasmuch as husband and wife had lived together only int
the District, the problem is clearly different from that in the Haddock7
and in the Atherton cases.
The court likewise intimated that the fact that defendant was at fault:
might be a circumstance bringing the Virginia decree within the operation
of the full faith and credit clause. When only comity is concerned, a.
majority of American courts are willing to recognize a divorce decree al-
though complainant alone was domiciled in the state of the forum;8 a few-
adopt the view that the factor of fault in the defendant is an additional
requisite.9 This latter position is preferred by the Restatemento and has.
1. Davis v. Davis (1938) 59 S. Ct. 3.
2. Art. 4, Sec. 1.
3. (1870) 9 Wall. 108.
4. The court cited the Cheever case only for the proposition that the
definitions of "matrimonial domicil" are varied.
5. (1901) 181 U. S. 155.
6. Goodrich, Matrimonial Domicil (1917) 27 Yale L. J. 49; Atherton vw
Atherton (1901) 181 U. S. 155; Haddock v. Haddock (1906) 201 U. S. 562
7. (1906) 201 U. S. 562.
8. Beale, Conflict of Laws (1931) 484, see. 113.2; Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws (1927) 290, sec. 127; Stumberg, Conflict of Laws (1937) 268 et seq.
9. See Loker v. Gerald (1882) 157 Mass. 42, 31 N. E. 709, 34 A. L. R.
252, 16 L. R. A. 497; Thomas v. King (1895) 95 Tenn. 60.
10. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) sec. l13a (ii).
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'been advanced by Professor Beale' as the rationale of the Haddock case.
Proponents of the fault theory argue that its application would achieve
.absolute uniformity and predictability in recognition of divorce decrees,
-alleviating the unfortunate social situation which exists when a marriage
•is considered dissolved in one state and not in another, 2 and that equali-
zation of the respective positions of husband and wife as to divorce would
.also follow.1s It has been subjected to vigorous criticism,14 however, on
the ground that the factual issue of fault is an extremely difficult one to
determine, 5 especially where, as is often the case, one10 or more17 of the
-parties are dead. Uniformity of decision would be as remote as ever be-
,cause of the troublesome aspects of ascertaining "fault" as a jurisdictional
problem, i. e., what degree of fault would be necessary, and what court
-and precedents would determine the relevant issues?18 Certainly the Su-
-preme Court would have to ascertain the legal content of the term; and,
since the Haddock decision in 1906, cases in point have only infrequently
-presented themselves.1 9 Moreover it is unlikely that many courts would
secede from the present majority view. 20 It is submitted that injection of
-the issue of "fault" only tends further to confuse a vague and nebulous
area in the conflicts field. No case has directly held "fault" a sufficient
'basis to compel full faith and credit. That even the Haddock case contains
such dicta may well be challenged.
It would seem that the theories on which the court acted are partially
inapplicable and may tend to perplex those who in the future may attempt
-to ascertain the precise holding in the present case. It would have been
sounder to rest the result on the principle of Cheever v. Wilson to which
'the Court made but a passing allusion.
C. J. D.
11. Beale, Conflict of Laws (1931) 497, see. 113.10.
12. McClintock, Fault as an Element of Divorce Jurisdiction (1928) 37
'Yale L. J. 564; Strahorn, A Rationale of the Haddock Case (1938) 32 II.
L. Rev. 796; Strahorn, The Supreme Court Revisits Haddock (1938) 33
-Ill. L. Rev. 412, n. 16.
13. Beale, Haddock Revisited (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 417; Beale, Con-
flict of Laws (1935) 505, sec. 113.11; Strahorn, The Supreme Court Re-
'visits Haddock (1938) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 412.
14. McClintock, Fault as an Element of Divorce Jurisdiction (1928) 37
Yale L. J. 564; Strahorn, A Rationale of the Haddock Case (1938) 32
-ill. L. Rev. 796.
15. McClintock, Fault as an Element of Divorce Jurisdiction (1928) 37
'Yale L. J. 564.
16. See Andrews v. Andrews (1903) 188 U. S. 14.
17. See Maynard v. Hill (1888) 125 U. S. 190.
18. The writer has in mind the question: "Is it the type of fault needed
-in a mere separation from bed and board or for an absolute divorce?" For
an amplification of the problem, see McClintock, Fault as an Element of
Divorce Jurisdiction (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 564.
19. Thompson v. Thompson (1913) 226 U. S. 551; Williams v. Osenton
(1914) 232 U. S. 625; Davis v. Davis (1938) 59 S. Ct. 3.
20. See McClintock, Fault as an Element of Divorce Jurisdiction (1928)
37 Yale L. J. 564. ,
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